Model the Aristotelian assertic syllogisms using modern notation. This section shows that the Aristotelian assertic syllogisms can be proven with our axioms of logic, and also provides generally useful theorems.
In antiquity Aristotelian logic and Stoic logic (see mptnan) were the leading logical systems. Aristotelian logic became the leading system in medieval Europe. This section models this system (including later refinements). Aristotle defined syllogisms very generally ("a discourse in which certain (specific) things having been supposed, something different from the things supposed results of necessity because these things are so") Aristotle, Prior Analytics 24b18-20. However, in Prior Analytics he limits himself to categorical syllogisms that consist of three categorical propositions with specific structures. The syllogisms are the valid subset of the possible combinations of these structures. The medieval schools used vowels to identify the types of terms (a=all, e=none, i=some, and o=some are not), and named the different syllogisms with Latin words that had the vowels in the intended order.
"There is a surprising amount of scholarly debate about how best to formalize Aristotle's syllogisms..." according to Aristotle's Modal Proofs: Prior Analytics A8-22 in Predicate Logic, Adriane Rini, Springer, 2011, ISBN 978-94-007-0049-9, page 28. For example, Lukasiewicz believes it is important to note that "Aristotle does not introduce singular terms or premisses into his system". Lukasiewicz also believes that Aristotelian syllogisms are predicates (having a true/false value), not inference rules: "The characteristic sign of an inference is the word 'therefore'... no syllogism is formulated by Aristotle primarily as an inference, but they are all implications." Jan Lukasiewicz, Aristotle's Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic, Second edition, Oxford, 1957, page 1-2. Lukasiewicz devised a specialized prefix notation for representing Aristotelian syllogisms instead of using standard predicate logic notation.
We instead translate each Aristotelian syllogism into an inference rule, and each rule is defined using standard predicate logic notation and predicates. The predicates are represented by wff variables that may depend on the quantified variable . Our translation is essentially identical to the one used in Rini page 18, Table 2 "Non-Modal Syllogisms in Lower Predicate Calculus (LPC)", which uses standard predicate logic with predicates. Rini states, "the crucial point is that we capture the meaning Aristotle intends, and the method by which we represent that meaning is less important". There are two differences: we make the existence criteria explicit, and we use , , and in the order they appear (a common Metamath convention). Patzig also uses standard predicate logic notation and predicates (though he interprets them as conditional propositions, not as inference rules); see Gunther Patzig, Aristotle's Theory of the Syllogism second edition, 1963, English translation by Jonathan Barnes, 1968, page 38. Terms such as "all" and "some" are translated into predicate logic using the approach devised by Frege and Russell. "Frege (and Russell) devised an ingenious procedure for regimenting binary quantifiers like "every" and "some" in terms of unary quantifiers like "everything" and "something": they formalized sentences of the form "Some A is B" and "Every A is B" as exists x (Ax and Bx) and all x (Ax implies Bx), respectively." "Quantifiers and Quantification", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/quantification/. See Principia Mathematica page 22 and *10 for more information (especially *10.3 and *10.26).
Expressions of the form "no is " are consistently translated as . These can also be expressed as , per alinexa. We translate "all is " to , "some is " to , and "some is not " to . It is traditional to use the singular form "is", not the plural form "are", in the generic expressions. By convention the major premise is listed first.
In traditional Aristotelian syllogisms the predicates have a restricted form ("x is a ..."); those predicates could be modeled in modern notation by more specific constructs such as , , or . Here we use wff variables instead of specialized restricted forms. This generalization makes the syllogisms more useful in more circumstances. In addition, these expressions make it clearer that the syllogisms of Aristotelian logic are the forerunners of predicate calculus. If we used restricted forms like instead, we would not only unnecessarily limit their use, but we would also need to use set and class axioms, making their relationship to predicate calculus less clear. Using such specific constructs would also be anti-historical; Aristotle and others who directly followed his work focused on relating wholes to their parts, an approach now called part-whole theory. The work of Cantor and Peano (over 2,000 years later) led to a sharper distinction between inclusion () and membership (); this distinction was not directly made in Aristotle's work.
There are some widespread misconceptions about the existential assumptions made by Aristotle (aka "existential import"). Aristotle was not trying to develop something exactly corresponding to modern logic. Aristotle devised "a companion-logic for science. He relegates fictions like fairy godmothers and mermaids and unicorns to the realms of poetry and literature. In his mind, they exist outside the ambit of science. This is why he leaves no room for such nonexistent entities in his logic. This is a thoughtful choice, not an inadvertent omission. Technically, Aristotelian science is a search for definitions, where a definition is "a phrase signifying a thing's essence." (Topics, I.5.102a37, Pickard-Cambridge.)... Because non-existent entities cannot be anything, they do not, in Aristotle's mind, possess an essence... This is why he leaves no place for fictional entities like goat-stags (or unicorns)." Source: Louis F. Groarke, "Aristotle: Logic", section 7. (Existential Assumptions), Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (A Peer-Reviewed Academic Resource), http://www.iep.utm.edu/aris-log/. Thus, some syllogisms have "extra" existence hypotheses that do not directly appear in Aristotle's original materials (since they were always assumed); they are added where they are needed. This affects barbari, celaront, cesaro, camestros, felapton, darapti, calemos, fesapo, and bamalip.
These are only the assertic syllogisms. Aristotle also defined modal syllogisms that deal with modal qualifiers such as "necessarily" and "possibly". Historically, Aristotelian modal syllogisms were not as widely used. For more about modal syllogisms in a modern context, see Rini as well as Aristotle's Modal Syllogistic by Marko Malink, Harvard University Press, November 2013. We do not treat them further here.
Aristotelian logic is essentially the forerunner of predicate calculus (as well as set theory since it discusses membership in groups), while Stoic logic is essentially the forerunner of propositional calculus.
The following twenty-four syllogisms (from barbara to bamalip) are all proven from { ax-mp, ax-1, ax-2, ax-3, ax-gen, ax-4 }, which corresponds in the usual translation to modal logic (a universal (resp. existential) quantifier maps to necessity (resp. possibility)) to the weakest normal modal logic (K). Some proofs could be shortened by using additionally spi (inference form of sp, which corresponds to the axiom (T) of modal logic), as demonstrated by dariiALT, barbariALT, festinoALT, barocoALT, daraptiALT.